"He," as it turned out, was the figurative fallen soldier of World War One (WW1), and "he" was "depending on your spirit, your labour, your recognition in facing current problems that the boss and the worker, the chief and the soldier, united within the hierarchy of industrial, military, or agricultural enterprise, are collaborators and friends." 2 La Rocque thus evoked a number of themes typical of the Croix de Feu, or Parti Social Français as the movement was renamed in June 1936. He called on a lineage of masculinity within French nationalism, from the soldiers of WW1 to the young students of 1938, to stress that, just as France's soldiers had performed their duty for la Patrie at the battles of the Marne and the Somme, subordinating their own interests to those of the nation, so their heirs should put aside the self-interested and counterproductive agenda of class struggle to work with their social betters for the collective good.
The Croix de Feu was originally a veterans' organization, founded in 1927 by Maurice d'Hartoy, but it was when La Rocque became the group's President in 1931 that it began to expand rapidly and, arguably, take on a fascist tone. 3 The Croix de Feu attracts a great deal of scholarly attention in French historiography for a variety of reasons.
tively underdeveloped line of inquiry in French history, due in large part to the almost total lack of interest in the approach among historians of French nationality. 8 Thus, gender in the French interwar period is almost exclusively developed by Anglophone scholars, including, most famously, Mary Louise Roberts. 9 The gendered aspects of the Croix de Feu have been all but ignored, and yet concepts of masculinity were central to French culture, as the work of Robert A. Nye on the importance of a male code of honour among nineteenthcentury French politicians, 10 and Joan Scott's observations about the centrality of masculinity to French conceptions of republicanism and citizenship both suggest. 11 Gender analysis of the Croix de Feu has only been approached by Mary Jean Green's examination of the appeals to and representation of women in Le Flambeau (The Torch), the movement's official paper until July 1937, and by Kevin Passmore's more substantial work on the paramilitarism of the movement, where he briefly considers questions of masculinity, as well as his research on the involvement of Croix de Feu/PSF women in social welfare work. These two efforts echo recent work by Daniella Sarnoff and Cheryl Koos who place women at the centre of their analyses of French fascism in that they posit the importance of women to the Croix de Feu, and hence to fascism. 12 
The one very notable exception to this is Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l'Éternel Féminin
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996) . This is of course not to say that there is not a considerable amount of excellent work done by French historians on women's history using feminist analy- 
264
Interestingly, Passmore and Green both approach the Croix de Feu as fascist, although Passmore sees the PSF differently, arguing that it was evolving towards a mass mobilizing form of traditional conservatism. 13 Green states at the outset that she accepts Robert Soucy and William Irvine's arguments that the Croix de Feu was fascist, 14 and proceeds on that basis to apply her conclusions about the movement to French fascism generally. This is problematic, as a scholarly consensus has not yet been reached on the important question of the Croix de Feu's membership in the fascist pantheon, although all agree that the Croix de Feu was significantly different from other fascist groups in some respects. While supporters of the Soucy/Irvine perspective are persuasive that the Croix de Feu shared many characteristics with fascist movements, including paramilitarism, authoritarianism, and a cult of the leader, others remain unconvinced. The latter point to La Rocque's and other leaders' near-constant assurances of their fidelity to the republican order, their adoption of parliamentary tactics in 1936 concomitant with the change in name to the PSF (a change necessitated by Léon Blum's Popular Front government, which outlawed paramilitary leagues, including the Croix de Feu, forcing La Rocque and his collaborators to reinvent the movement as a proper political party), 15 and La Rocque's later activities in the French resistance. Further, the most recent monograph on the Croix de Feu, by emerging scholar Sean Kennedy, concludes that while the movement was certainly violently anti-communist and antidemocratic, it was not fascist, but rather a new form of conservative authoritarianism. 16 One of Kennedy's arguments is that an effort to construct "a new man," so central to other fascisms, was missing from the The answers are complex. The Croix de Feu's masculine discourse contained both important convergences and divergences from that propagated by interwar French republican conservatives. Like the conservative ideal, the Croix de Feu's masculine exemplar was to be hardworking, selfless, patriotic, paternalist, paterfamilial, and "racially" French. These characteristics were clearly borrowed from the mainstream right. There was nothing specifically fascist about them.
However, there were other key elements to what we might term "Croix de Feu masculinity," which were indeed novel, and representative of the fascist new man. While all interwar French political parties celebrated their deceased leaders and notables, the Croix de Feu developed a particularly poignant cult of martyrdom. Its commentators used the movement's dead to pontificate about masculine ideals, much as did the National Socialists in Germany around figures such as murdered Stürmabteilung leader Horst Wessel. 19 Mosse, in fact, argues that the exaltation of masculine martyrs was typical of fascisms, fingering Gabriele D'Annunzio as an important pioneer in this regard. 20 The Croix de Feu's cult was decidedly militaristic, and reflected the general militarization of masculinity within the movement -a militarization irrefutably in common with the ideal man of fascist parties and movements. Further, like fascist parties, the Croix de Feu issued a call to men to rally to its banner in hyper-masculine terms. It used intemperate language, not often found on the republican right, and offered a vision, as did La Rocque in addressing the readers of L'Étudiant Social, of French manhood marching towards the future united in an organic hierarchy modelled on the nationalist masculine harmony purportedly found in the Great War's trenches. 21 Finally, La Rocque's appeal to students was indicative of another element of the Croix de Feu's ideal man: he was preferably young, virile and vigorous, with a well-developed and robust physique, an 18 Mosse describes the fascist new man thus: "The inner characteristics of this new man were … clearly defined: athletic, persevering, filled with self-denial and the spirit of sacrifice. At the same time, the new fascist man must be energetic, courageous and laconic. In contrast to the mainstream elements of Croix de Feu masculinity, these more radical components were closer to Communist masculinity than to that found on the republican right. The Communists too developed a cult of martyrs, constructed a militarized manhood, and praised youthful virtues such as dynamism, athleticism, and a predilection to act rather than intellectualize. But this does not mean that the Croix de Feu was somehow communistic: rather, as Robert Paxton has recently reemphasized, it was precisely this sort of synthesis of the conservative and Marxist aesthetics that characterized fascism. 22 The Croix de Feu sprang from the conservative right, but adopted the style of the far-left, including its appeal to a radical manliness, in order to mobilize the working class in defence of the nation and social order. This was absolutely typical of fascisms. By looking at Croix de Feu masculinity, it is possible both to perceive the movement's fascism with new clarity and to see exactly how the Croix de Feu achieved the fascist synthesis in its gender politics, while also gaining insights into French society and culture in the interwar period.
Third Republican politics were notoriously splintered, complex, and confusing. In part, this was because Deputies and Senators tended to function as autonomous political actors, free from the encumbrances of party discipline. Moreover, parties at various times allowed their members and parliamentarians to belong simultaneously to other groups. Since there were over 600 Deputies and Senators in France, the picture of shifting alliances and groupings was predictably chaotic (see Figure 1 ).
There were, however, three parties of note on the republican right with which one can compare the Croix de Feu: the Alliance Démocratique (AD), the Parti Démocrate Populaire (PDP), and the Fédération Républicaine (FR). There were important differences among these three parties. The PDP, for example, was explicitly Christian Democratic while the AD was much more secular in its orientation. Nonetheless, combined, they promoted a coherent and consistent conservative republican masculinity. 23 22 Since the Croix de Feu drew many of its members, among both the rank and file and the leadership, from the parties of republican conservatism, it unsurprisingly adopted many of the masculine values held by the AD, PDP, and FR. Croix de Feu leaders and commentators accordingly extolled the virtues of hard work and dedication, self-abnegation, paternalism, fatherhood, and the so-called French race.
Hard work and dedication to the cause were foremost among the masculine characteristics espoused by Croix de Feu leaders, thinkers, and members. The unnamed author of the party pamphlet, "Why I Joined the Parti Social Français," published in 1936, indicated that one of the primary reasons he joined the party was to "rehabilitate work," which implies that he felt France to be suffering from widespread indolence. 24 Likewise, in a tribute to deceased member Michel Gouriand, Le Flambeau emphasized that his "life [was] full of work and devotion," and called on readers to follow his example. 25 Work was 268 seen as regenerative: France would be saved through the sweat and toil of Croix de Feu members. This theme of revivification through work was particularly evident in calls on men to labour unfailingly for the movement. The Croix de Feu, adherents were consistently told, would return France to glory through the common enterprise of its cadres. Jean Ybarnégaray, the leader of the then-nascent PSF's parliamentary group, called on PSF men, in October, 1936 to "Work intensely for our goals in the ranks of the PARTI SOCIAL FRANÇAIS. … follow LA ROCQUE, and lead France behind him." 26 Similarly, propagandist François Veuillot, who claimed to be unaffiliated with the PSF but whose tone was decidedly partial, exalted La Rocque as a man who was "desirous of working for the welfare of his country…." 27 This valorization of faithful labour for the cause could become near-comic, as even the most mundane of activities became infused with an aura of patriotic heroism. Antoinette de Préval, for example, the most prominent woman within the organization, applauded "the kindness, the discipline, the courage, and the faith," of male volunteers who had provided security at a youth rally. This devotion, Préval continued, was bound to lead to the "great patriotic victory," for which all members were striving. 28 This tendency to exalt men's work ethic and cast it in exaggerated patriotic terms was far from unique in interwar French politics. Louis Marin, for example, the leader of the Fédération Républicaine, remembered the recently deceased Georges Ducrocq, the editor of the FR's weekly, La Nation, as "an exceptional worker for the welfare of the country…." 29 Note that, like Croix de Feu speakers and authors, Marin equated work for his party with work for the nation. In the same vein, electrician and secretary of the Parti Démocrate Populaire's youth group in Perreux, F. Durand, outlined in an interview his own devoted efforts to spread the party's doctrine and so save the country from the threat of communist revolution. 30 Like the Croix de Feu, the PDP saw its own goals as synonymous with those of France and placed a high value on men's work as furthering those interests.
A key component of this work ethic was selflessness, most often expressed as "self-abnegation" or "disinterestedness. ment, the party, and the nation, all of which a true man would serve without question. The Croix de Feu section in Royan struck exactly these chords in a letter to La Rocque in a response to a speech of Ybarnégaray's in the Chamber of Deputies, saying that its members, "congratulate their Chief Colonel de La Roque [sic] for the courage and self-abnegation that he demonstrated in extending a loyal hand to his adversaries in the hopes of achieving the great National Reconciliation." 31 La Rocque himself often expressed this theme of selflessness in his own correspondence. For example, one of his more interesting practices was to write personally to members who had been injured while participating in Croix de Feu events. In so doing, he solidified the bonds between the rank and file and its leadership, and he also drew lessons from the recipient's comportment. On 13 October 1936, for example, he wrote Raymond Guenard, a member from the Marne, who was reportedly shot by a Communist Party (PCF) agitator: "I don't doubt for a second, my dear friend, that you remain devoted to our cause. But, after the sacrifice that you have already made in so generously spilling your blood for our Country, I hesitate to again abuse your self-abnegation." 32 Selflessness was a theme in common with the republican right (though engaging in street combat with the Communist Party was not). In many ways, this obsession with unity and self-effacement was a legacy of WW1 as politicians repeatedly stressed that it was the selfless "National Union" of the war years that had secured victory. Conservative Raymond Poincaré, then President of the Republic and a member of the Alliance Républicaine Démocratique, the forerunner to the AD, in a speech read on his behalf to the Chamber of Deputies in 1920, made exactly this point. 33 In keeping with this memory of the utility of self-sacrifice for the nation, interwar conservatives, just like the Croix de Feu, continued to valorize this masculine trait. Robert Cornilleau, for example, the editor of Le Petit Démocrate, the PDP's journal, praised the "magnificent disinterestedness" of party militant Marcel Robert in his obituary, 34 while Alliance Démocratique notable Pierre Auscher proclaimed that party leader Pierre-Étienne Flandin's, "disinterestedness [was] absolute." 35 As one might gather from these examples, selflessness could have different implications for different men. For a simple party member, it usually meant following orders and sacrificing for the cause, while, for party leaders, it might The public portrayal of La Rocque's private life also suggested a loving and protective father. This was most evident upon the death of his daughter, Nadine, in August 1934. Nadine was eulogized at length in Le Flambeau, constructed as a female martyr for the movement (even though she died of natural causes unrelated to her political activities), and her father's grief was made apparent in the paper's pages. 40 La Rocque also got messages from well-wishers unaffiliated with the movement upon Nadine's death, including the prominent FR Deputy, Pastor Edouard Soulier. 42 Soulier's missive reflected the paternalist ethos, similar to if perhaps not always as overt as that of the Croix de Feu, found among conservative republicans. Louis Marin, for example, much like La Rocque, practised a form of patronage where he, like a good father, intervened when he felt it appropriate to secure special treatment and employment for FR members, friends, and acquaintances, and maintained a healthy interest in the welfare of his FR "family." 43 One aspect equally crucial to Croix de Feu and republican conservative masculinities was fatherhood. Men were encouraged not only to act as good fathers, but to become fathers, preferably of large families. This confirms Cheryl Koos' finding that pro-natalism was an area of considerable crossover both intellectually and literally between fascists and rightwing conservatives. 44 Croix de Feu commentators, throughout the period under examination, evinced considerable anxiety about France's unimpressive birthrate. In early 1936, for example, a Dr. Orth published two articles in Le Flambeau raising the alarm that the number of deaths in France had exceeded the number of births in 1935, while comparing that frightening statistic with the German example, where, thanks to the Nazis' policies, births were once again on the incline. 45 In accordance with this concern, the PSF declared in its founding programme in 1936, that
The family is at once the goal of, the justification, and the recompense for human effort.
The Parti Social Français fights for the rights of the family. There is no better 'politics of the family' than a truly social politics, unabashedly French: protection of and respect for children, and for the mother of the family in the home; support for their material and moral interests; vigilance concerning their patrimony; encouragement to save, support for small property owners, the promotion of hygiene and of teaching; a cult of tradition and spirituality. 
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Clearly, "the family" was front and center in the movement's worldview. The Croix de Feu/PSF's official slogan was, after all, "Work, Family, Fatherland." This, infamously, was later adopted by the Vichy regime. 47 While in its defense of the traditional family, the Croix de Feu seemingly went beyond the parties of the republican right, those parties were also energetic in representing themselves as the family's champions. FR Deputy Georges Pernot, for one, was a steadfast defender of the family. In 1928, for instance, he penned an article criticizing the government's budget on the grounds that it did not sufficiently promote the family's interests. 48 Prominent conservative feminist Madame Le Vert Chotard, the leader of the Union Nationale Pour le Vote des Femmes, who aligned herself with the PDP, likewise defined feminism's raison d'être as, "to struggle against immorality, slums, and alcoholism, which are so destructive to the family." 49 Even the Croix de Feu found it hard to outdo the PDP in defense of the traditional family. Reflecting the PDP's social Catholic roots, barely an issue of Le Petit Démocrate did not feature at least one article about problems confronting French families. 50 The PDP, like the FR and AD, advocated policies in agreement with its familialism. This was both an appeal to male breadwinners' votes, and a reflection of the party's heartfelt social conservatism. Foremost among these planks in the party's platform were its calls for the "family vote" and the "family wage." The family vote had many incarnations, but in principle its advocates desired that heads of families ("pères de famille") should have extra votes due to their increased responsibilities. 51 Most often, the suggestion was that the père de famille should exercise an extra vote for each of his dependents. Le Petit Démocrate came out in favour of a form of the family vote a few months before the PDP itself was constituted. Its unnamed editorialist outlined the logic of the argument very neatly:
The husband represents his wife in civil claims; he has the duty to protect her, to meet her needs and those of his children; he is responsible for the imprudent behaviour or offenses committed by these children. It is therefore just that he represent his wife and his children in the legislative process. 52 47 Green, "Gender, Fascism, and the Croix de Feu," 230. The Croix de Feu shared this logic, and supported the family vote accordingly. Indeed, the movement's oft-trumpeted support for women's suffrage was conditional on its being adopted in partnership with the family vote. 53 Supporting the traditional family came before, and would have been seen as synonymous with, women's rights.
Similarly, all the parties of the republican right advocated different versions of the family wage, which would allow mothers to stay at home to raise their children while fathers earned enough to support everyone in their families. Most often, the parties proposed that men's wages be indexed, in some fashion, to the number of their dependents. Commentators felt that this would have the added benefit of providing an incentive for couples to reproduce: if you wanted the family wage, you would have to produce the family. 54 The Croix de Feu, in comparison, went somewhat beyond the traditional parties and came out in favour of a national programme of family allocations to supplement all fathers' incomes, regardless of their occupations. The other parties were a bit more cautious, not wishing to either do too much harm to profit margins, or to stimulate unnecessary state interventionism. 55 This willingness to use state power to promote large families on the part of the Croix de Feu was shared by the Italian Fascists and German Nazis. 56 Of course, while desiring to promote large, robust French families, neither the Croix de Feu nor its equivalents on the republican right wanted to see a similar expansion among the "foreign" population in France. Most commonly, this xenophobic or racist aspect to rightwing pro-natalism was apparent in the frequent conflation of nation and race. For example, in one sentence, an author might discuss the future of the nation, and in the next lament the degeneration of the race. Sometimes, however, even on the republican right, racism could play a more explicit role, as some commentators pointedly remarked that immigration would not solve the problem of depopulation. 57 Thus, while the Croix de Feu's language around issues of immigration, as in the following extract, was generally a bit more extreme than that of its republican counterparts, its sentiments were far from unique. Writing of "… all the horde from ethnic areas, steppe or desert, who burden our economy, our social laws, our hospitals, our asylums and our prisons," it declared that "Immigration and nationalization are not remedies to the continued decline of the birth rate. They are not even palliatives." 58 It seems safe to conclude, then, that the Croix de Feu's ideal man was both a father and "French."
Anti-Semitism is of special interest to historians of the far right. While historians generally concur that it was not an essential element of fascism, given its relative unimportance, in particular, to the Italian Fascists, 59 the spectre of the Holocaust, and in France, of events such as the Dreyfus Affair, necessitate its investigation. As for the Croix de Feu, while it rarely displayed an overt antiSemitism, following the tradition of the anti-Dreyfusards, it equated "Jewishness" with effeminacy. "The Jew" represented urbanity, modernism, internationalism, finance capital, and "the intellectual": in short, all the things the radical right despised. 60 Accordingly, a "real man" could not be Jewish, or at least, if he was Jewish, he had to overcome his Semitism.
This anti-Semitic element to Croix de Feu masculinity was usually phrased in code. A favourite keyword, for example, was "parasite." An official propaganda pamphlet asked the question, "What Kind of Men do We Want?" The answer was revealing:
Let us disdain intellectuals, opportunists, combinationists, idlers, parasites, profiteers! Out with them. No more discoursing lawyers, windbag committeemen, parliamentarians! With us, men of faith and character above all ... Catholics, Protestants, freethinkers, good Jews! 61
The catalogue -intellectuals, opportunists, and so on -contains all the typical bugaboos of the radical right, but the "parasites [and] profiteers," reference, in particular, reads like an allusion to Jews and finance capital, usually assumed to be Jewish. The suggestion that the movement welcomed "good Jews," of course, indicates that there were "bad Jews." What made one Jew good, and the other bad, presumably, was that a good Jew would not have belonged in any of the aforementioned categories, categories which mirrored the typical rightwing conception of "Jewishness." Indeed, Croix de Feu leaders sometimes had to define this crucial difference more carefully. In one such instance, for example, a member wrote the head office to inquire as to the group's position vis à vis the "Jewish question." The head of propaganda replied, quoting liberally from La Rocque's book, Public Service. On the one hand, La Rocque, as he did quite consistently, insisted that Jews were welcome in the movement and that French identity was not defined by religion: what mattered was "French devotion." On the other, La Rocque and his propaganda chief by proxy, drew the classic distinction of a particular kind of French anti-Semite, between "good" French Jews, and "bad" foreign ones supposedly "invading" France:
… among the latter, numerous islets form for whom persecution is but a cover for espionage. To point this out is not to commit an anti-Semitic act. I know many Israelites for whom this latent invasion appears like a menace not only for the country, but for their coreligionists privileged with the rights of citizenship; I know many Israelites in whose eyes this rush of German Jews represents the peril of provoking an anti-Semitic reaction. 62 Anti-Semitism, in this view, was the fault of Jews themselves. Foreign Jews, in this case German, were flooding France causing an understandable and justified backlash. In a speech to the PSF's departmental congress of the Rhône in 1937, La Rocque again blamed Jews for the spread of anti-Semitism, focusing his accusation, this time, on the Jewish Socialist Léon Blum, then the Premier of France's Popular Front government: "I call on all the patriotic Israelites and Lord knows that we have many of them, very dear to us, in our ranks, and I invite them to put on trial Léon Blum, a member of their religion all of whose activity unfolds as though he wants to unleash in France an unjust and fearsome wave of anti-Semitism." 63 It seems likely, therefore, that while it was theoretically possible for an exemplary Croix de Feu man to be Jewish, he would have had to exude the sort of rugged, patriotic masculinity considered by the far-right to be antithetical to Jewish identity in order to compensate for his Semitic handicap. A good Jew, in other words, would not be a Jew.
This xenophobic brand of anti-Semitism, sadly, was not the exclusive property of the extreme right. It surfaced somewhat infrequently in the Croix de Feu; it was perhaps less apparent on the republican right; but it was there, and sometimes openly so as when Paul Archambault, a Deputy from the PDP, penned the lead article for Le Petit Démocrate on 12 June 1938, "The Jewish World and Its Destiny." In this piece, Archambault evinced considerable hostility to France's Jewish population, which, according to him, had "a place manifestly disproportionate to its numerical importance" in the economic life of the country. 64 Blum, in particular, seemed to bring out the worst instincts of the right. Even the AD, whose leader, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, was at pains to distance himself from anti-Semitism, was prone to diatribes laced with antiSemitism about Blum's lack of patriotism, his insidious internationalism, and his being "the High Priest" of socialism. 65 In sum, while Robert Soucy remains correct that anti-Semitism was not central to the Croix de Feu ethos, he is also right to assert its presence both within the movement, and within La Rocque's thinking. 66 However, this hardly made the Croix de Feu unique or qualified it as fascist: the movement's anti-Semitism was very much a product of its time and rightwing milieu.
While these masculine traits -a strong work ethic, selflessness, patriotism, paternalism, fatherhood, and being French -converged with those promoted on the republican right, the Croix de Feu's discourse on masculinity also possessed characteristics more specifically fascist in nature. For one, the movement created a hyper-masculine cult of the dead, evoking and constructing the memories of its martyrs to serve as masculine exemplars for surviving militants. These martyrs served as reminders to Croix de Feu militants of their responsibilities as men. Unsurprisingly perhaps, for a group which began as a veterans' organization, this cult of martyrs reflected a wider militarization of masculinity within the movement. Good men conducted themselves as good soldiers, showing discipline, following orders, and sacrificing for the greater good. In turn, this militarized manliness was part and parcel of a much more aggressive and hyper-masculine character to Croix de Feu masculinity than that found on the republican right, with the result that the movement wholeheartedly embraced the mobilization of youth and celebrated youthful attributes, including physically fit bodies, as the epitome of manliness. This stood in stark contrast to the parties of traditional conservatism, which remained very cautious about both the material and discursive merits of youthful vigour. Indeed, this radical side of Croix de Feu masculinity had more in common with Communist manhood: the Croix de Feu, in keeping with the mimicry of fascism argued for by Robert Paxton, 67 borrowed from the Communist aesthetic in its construction of masculinity. It doubtless also imitated Nazism and Italian Fascism, themselves copying the far-left.
Throughout its relatively brief history, the Croix de Feu/PSF cast its dead as martyrs for the movement. The canon could include simple party members or national heroes, such as Marshall Hubert Lyautey, who, though not affiliated officially with the Croix de Feu, exemplified the virtues the movement sought to instill in its men.
The Croix de Feu, in Le Flambeau and elsewhere, constantly evoked the memory of those who had died in World War One as a reminder to its followers to honour them by living in the appropriately masculine fashion. The Great War set the tone, in a very tangible sense, for the movement, as La Rocque and his fellow travelers' compulsion to remember those who had fallen for France between 1914 and 1918 translated smoothly into doing the same for the movement's own dead. The official anthem of "The Association of Those Decorated to the Peril of Their Own Lives," 68 revealed clearly the links between the War, masculinity, and the movement's paramilitarism. As the last verse declared, Are we going to lose the benefit Of our twenty centuries of glory and honour? Will we have made a vain sacrifice, Of so much blood and so much pain. This insignia adorning our buttonholes 69 Must remind us, Friends, at all times That the Fatherland wants that our proud souls Work together for its greatness. 70 A particularly common device for Croix de Feu commentators was to castigate their political opponents for dishonouring the memory of the war dead. In "To Our Dead," for example, published on Remembrance Day, 1931, an he received letters comparing him to the great Marshal. 77 La Rocque continued to cast himself as being part of a line of masculine authority descended from Lyautey. He did so right to the end, with his last publication, In the Service of the Future, published posthumously in 1946. 78 More pedestrian figures in the movement could also serve as martyrs, particularly if they died in the performance of their Croix de Feu duties. Such was the case with Charles Muntz, a member from Mulhouse, who was killed, apparently by a Communist bullet, in 1936. The article mourning his passing was entitled, "A New Martyr." 79 If Kevin Passmore is correct, it is quite likely that Muntz was killed by a PCF agitator. Passmore's research indicates that, while the Croix de Feu/PSF could be provocative in its behaviour, the Communists almost always initiated actual violence, so much so that La Rocque decreed a change of tactics to avoid confrontation with PCF militants. 80 At any rate, Le Flambeau followed Muntz's death with a bitter condemnation of the Popular Front government for not finding and prosecuting Muntz's murderer(s). 81 There was a certain irony in the Croix de Feu, which claimed to be the only organization capable of dealing with Communist aggression, turning to the Popular Front government, dominated by Socialists and leftwing Radicals, for protection from the PCF.
The Croix de Feu had, in fact, imitated the far-left in its construction of a militant brand of masculinity. The Communists and the Socialists had pioneered the rituals and testimonials typical of the Croix de Feu's cult of martyrs. Certainly, the messages on the left were different -party militancy was to be in the cause of the revolution or class solidarity rather than the nation -but the style was essentially the same. Both the Marxist parties, for example, held elaborate yearly rituals in memory of Jean Jaurès, the French Socialist leader murdered in July, 1914, and plastered their publications with glowing tributes to him. These were invariably, in a fashion similar to the Croix de Feu, careful to highlight Jaurès' masculine fortitude and perseverance and to hold him aloft as an example for others to follow. As Marcel Sembat told his fellow Socialists, in remembering Jaurès' qualities, "we will rediscover the taste for struggle and the strength to continue this eternal combat that he never tired of. 
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While the Croix de Feu revered a past captured by its cult of martyrdom, it, like the National Socialist Party in Germany, sought to blend the past, the present, and the future in its innovative use of technology. Sean Kennedy has documented the affinity for aviation in the Croix de Feu. 83 La Rocque, like Hitler, would travel the country by plane and, on grander occasions, the Croix de Feu would use airplanes in its exercises. No man more embodied this aspect of Croix de Feu masculinity than Jean Mermoz. Mermoz was one of France's great interwar pilots, and he became the Croix de Feu's equivalent of Nazism's Hermann Goering or Italian Fascism's Italo Balbo. 84 His daring exploits, particularly in crossing the South Atlantic, were legendary. In 1935, he was recruited to the movement and placed in charge of its aviation programme. 85 Mermoz quickly ascended to a place of considerable privilege in the Croix de Feu hierarchy, becoming one of four members of the executive committee of the PSF upon its formation. 86 Unfortunately, on 7 December 1936, his plane disappeared while traversing the South Atlantic. 87 A veritable cascade of tributes to him followed in Croix de Feu literature, and continued intermittently long after his death. La Rocque himself set the tone in the days following Mermoz's disappearance with several first page homages to his friend in Le Flambeau. These were hopeful at first that Mermoz would be found, but acceptance followed, and La Rocque quickly signalled Mermoz's martyr status:
Not having the honour to be a pilot, I will not describe in detail here his professional virtuosity or science. My respect for faithful heroism, for simple self-abnegation, for technical expertise, forbids me all profane incursions into his noble profession. [I recall instead] the inner flame of his ardor, of his intelligence, and of his purity. 88 The cult constructed around Mermoz's memory was truly formidable. The PSF was particularly aggressive in pushing his example upon its youth. Party 91 The first issue was also inundated with stories and images of Mermoz. Bernard Boringe's text was typical of the paper's hyperbole in its praise of Mermoz's masculine qualities: "…Mermoz had to have a legendary end worthy of a superhuman hero." 92 Similar tributes likewise appeared in the party's youth publications, indicating the omnipresence and persistence of "the cult of Mermoz." 93 The aviator, like Lyautey, became a Croix de Feu martyr.
Provocatively, the fascist Parti Populaire Français also appropriated Mermoz's memory for its cause. Not only did the party's paper, L'Émancipation Nationale, eulogize him repeatedly in near-identical terms to the Croix de Feu, 94 but the PPF too used him as an example to its youth, naming one of the six "phalanges" of the "Sporting Union of French Youth," founded in December 1938, after the dead pilot, and telling its young summer campers to emulate him. 95 This use within the two parties of Jean Mermoz as a masculine model suggests how valuable he was for the purveyors of fascist masculinity and demonstrates the proximity of the Croix de Feu to the PPF. On the 27th, he underwent an exceptionally grave operation, made inevitable by the depredations of a long deportation to Germany, and rendered hopeless by eight months of illegal detention in liberated France.
On the 28th, he left, in a breath, this cruel and absurd world. 97 While martyrdom, in itself, is certainly not inherently fascist, the militarized nature of the Croix de Feu's cult of martyrs was. It was meant to inspire followers with martial values -a sense of duty, obedience to superiors, courage, heroism, a love of order. La Rocque's masculine image demonstrates this well. Unlike more moderate leaders like Louis Marin or Pierre-Etienne Flandin, who sought to exude competence, experience, and respectability, 98 La Rocque cul-tivated an image of steely determination, discipline, and commanding presence. Accordingly, he did not present himself as a great or fiery orator, but rather as a plain-speaking military man who knew the value of action over words. 99 As he modestly told an audience in Bordeaux, "If I have had citations, it's because, more lucky than others, I was not killed.
[…] But apart from all that, I, quite simply, did my duty." 100 This kind of heroic masculine stoicism was both similar and dissimilar to the image constructed around the PPF leader, Jacques Doriot. Doriot, an exCommunist Deputy who formed his own party in 1936 after having been unceremoniously dumped by the PCF in 1934, ostensibly for refusing a summons to Moscow from Stalin, 101 projected a decidedly hyper-masculine persona, full of martial imagery, which epitomized the fascist "new man" in many respects. Like La Rocque, Doriot and his henchmen drew attention to his wartime heroism and his cold determination in the armed struggle. 102 Unlike La Rocque, Doriot was a charismatic speaker and was often, like Mussolini, portrayed doing physical activities. 103 That Doriot had earned his masculinist spurs first with the Jeunesses Communistes campaigning against militarism and colonialism, 104 only underscores the crossover of the radical components of the extremes' masculine discourses. This intersection, moreover, may have eased Doriot's passage from one end of the political spectrum to the other.
As in the realm of image and discourse, the Croix de Feu arranged its men into militaristic formations. The group's founding manifesto declared, "We have simply maintained from our time in the military the spirit of camaraderie, the spirit of discipline necessary for the success of our organization, for the execution of our ideas; the deference that our chiefs deserved; the respect for order; the love of our country; the devotion to the flag." 105 It was only logical, then, that the movement organized itself along martial lines. There was a rigid, welldefined hierarchy with La Rocque at its apex. There were gradations within the membership denoting different functions and status. The actual Croix de Feu were decorated war veterans; 106 the "Briscards" 107 were simple veterans with at least six months in the trenches; the "National Volunteers" were those too young to have served in WW1; the "Dispos" (short for "Disponsibles" -"Availables") and their successors, the "Voluntary Propaganda Teams," engaged in street-fighting and other forms of militaristic activism; there were different youth groups organized according to age and sex; and women's groups dedicated to suitably feminine tasks. In turn, the military organization continued within these sub-groups, as the National Volunteers, for example, were broken into sets of five facilitating their mobilization. 108 Further, the authoritarianism of this elaborate apparatus was underlined by La Rocque's insistence that he be the head of every group -everyone was responsible to him personally. 109 In short, as Kennedy remarks, like other totalitarian fascisms, the Croix de Feu set about constructing a "counter-society" in opposition to its democratic pluralistic counterpart. 110 Nor was this militarizing merely for show. As Passmore's research makes abundantly clear, the movement staged elaborate military maneuvers where volunteers, for example, would storm into city centers in motorized columns and seize temporary control of town squares, often in front of the town hall. 111 These certainly appeared to detractors as dress rehearsals for a violent seizure of power; 112 it was impossible to imagine the parties of the republican right behaving in a similar fashion.
It would also have been unthinkable for republican conservatives to engage in storming the National Assembly, but, on the other hand, the Croix de Feu's members were involved in just such an attempt on 6 February 1934, when a demonstration involving far right groups protesting the infamous Stavisky corruption scandal got out of hand, whether by design or accident, and moved on the Palais Bourbon, housing the Chamber of Deputies. 113 True, La Rocque himself opposed this violence, but not from a principled objection to such tactics; rather, the Colonel felt that public opinion was insufficiently prepared for a coup d'état. 114 Moreover, in the period prior to 6 February, La Rocque continuously suggested to his underlings that, "The hour will sound, for the Croix de Feu and Briscards, to save the country a second time." 115 This ruminating about a future seizure of power seems more in keeping with a fascist than a republican organization.
The Communists were also in the street on 6 February. Not only did the Communists and fascists share a desire for and a mythology surrounding a violent attack on the Republic, but the Communists too militarized masculinity. This was in keeping, of course, with the Leninist ideology of the vanguard of the proletariat: Communists had to be highly disciplined and well-organized. This militarization of Communist masculinity prefigured or at least accompanied fascism's, and was apparent in the Communist idolization of the Red Army. 116 The militarization of masculinity typical of the Croix de Feu, was also evident in fascist literature. The works of Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, in particular, consistently stressed the theme that true men sought out adventure in war, while effete weaklings stayed on the home front. 117 Even Robert Brasillach, certainly no manly prototype in his own right, painted his ideal man as a warrior in his novel, La Conquérante. 118 It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the militarization of manhood in the Croix de Feu was more typically fascist than republican conservative.
Another component of the Croix de Feu's masculine ideal that appears representative of fascism, and almost antithetical to rightwing republicanism, was its youthfulness. The movement, especially post-1934, went to great lengths to mobilize and organize youthful adherents. It set up summer camps, established clubhouses in urban areas, ran activities, organized picnics, and created Croix de Feu student groups, complete with their own press. 119 As a document out-lining the goals of the group for children under thirteen specified, "The purpose is to introduce the youth to the Croix de Feu movement and to develop in them the national spirit." 120 Clearly, this mobilization of youth was not disinterested: it was politically motivated.
In this too, the Croix de Feu followed the Communist Party. The PCF busily organized youth from its inception, having inherited the apparatus of the pre-1921 Jeunesses Socialistes, and this was very much part of the Communist attempt to construct a new man. For, as then Party Secretary Albert Treint declared, "Youths are the future of communism!" 121 Youths' masculinity, militancy, and activism were accordingly celebrated regularly in the Communist press. 122 In contrast, the republican right made at best tepid attempts to incorporate youth into its parties. The values espoused by the AD, FR, and PDP's youth organizations seemed more designed to stifle and contain youthful exuberance than to encourage and exploit it. The AD youth group's founding manifesto, for example, called on members to, "maintain liberal traditions[:]" 123 a worthy goal, perhaps, but hardly one designed to fire youthful passions. Le Petit Démocrate ceased carrying a youth page altogether in 1935, deeming the announcement of the page's demise so unimportant that it buried it on page three. 124 The PPF and the Croix de Feu also glorified "action," which they associated with youth, versus oratory and debate, which were classified as the purview of "mediocrities and incompetents." 125 Dynamism and energy, coded as youthful qualities, were highly valued within both organizations, as both sought to promote the advent of a "new man." As R. Fallay commented approvingly in a report on the Croix de Feu Federation of the Somme, its leader, "comrade Bouchet," was "full of good will, [and] very dynamic." 126 La Rocque, in fact, made a point of privileging youth in the movement. This led him, for example, to withdraw the Croix de Feu's support from the campaign of respected Deputy and ardent champion of pro-natalism, Louis Duval-Arnould, in the 1936 elections, with the result that the septuagenarian Duval-Arnould lost his seat to a much younger man who enjoyed La Rocque's continued patronage. 127 Such a betrayal would have been unimaginable in any of the FR, PDP or AD, where age and experience were not just respected, but venerated. A commentator in La Nation, the FR's weekly, for instance, touched on both his party's respect for its elders and its ambivalence towards youth as he wrote, "Our French youth maintain their excellent qualities of loyalty and enthusiasm. Our middle aged men are always happy to profit from their life experiences," but opined that, because too many young boys were missing their fathers' guidance, thanks to WW1, they were flocking to the PCF. 128 Youth, in other words, could not be trusted to its own devices. That age and experience were valued on the republican right was clear, as well, in the Le Petit Démocrate series, "Our Militants." On 30 October 1927, for example, the six men profiled were all in their forties, fifties, or sixties, and "his experience" was oft-listed among each man's virtues. 129 Respect for one's elders was institutionalized in the republican system: at the opening session of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the eldest among the members of the House presided as speaker and gave a speech to his colleagues, imparting the wisdom of his years. 130 It is difficult to imagine that this tradition would have persisted in a future Croix de Feu state.
Within the Croix de Feu the glorification of youthful masculinity intersected with an emphasis on physically fit male bodies. This tendency has long been noted by observers as central to fascist gender discourse, 131 and some, such as Theodor Adorno and Jean-Paul Sartre, have even used it to denigrate fascists as effeminate homosexuals. 132 More recently, scholars have distanced themselves from such unfounded and value-laden classifications, 133 but the consensus remains that fascism was, in some respects, a celebration of the male body. The Croix de Feu, again like the Communists, 134 certainly made sports and physical activities the focus of its advances to and cultivation of young boys and men. The constitutive meeting of the "Sons of Croix de Feu," decreed that the following activities would instill the proper sense of "honour" and "duty" in participants:
… hiking, camping, swimming, running obstacle courses, high, long and lateral jumping, pole-vaulting, Greek and Roman wrestling, ball games, packing lunches, flying, and swimming in teams, fencing, discus, javelin, and spear throwing, archery and target shooting, cycling, and military preparation at summer camps. 135 The documentation suggests that the Sons of Croix de Feu's subsequent activities followed this intensely physical regimen quite faithfully. 136 As Gaëtan Maire, the President of the "Society for Preparation and Sporting Education," a PSF organization founded in 1934, explained, "the physical perfecting of a race is indispensable in order to maintain it among the first rank of great modern nations." 137 The Croix de Feu organized its manhood accordingly.
The Croix de Feu's masculine discourse was a "mixed bag." It contained elements in common with its republican conservative equivalent, but also diverged from it in important respects. Like the ideal rightwing republican man, the Croix de Feu's masculine archetype was hardworking, he was selfless, patriotic, paternalist, a father, and he was most definitely "French." That these qualities were valued across the right of the political spectrum permits a good deal of insight into interwar French society. A picture emerges of a racist, xenophobic, nationalistic, hierarchical, and patriarchal France existing alongside that more romanticized and enlightened version of the revolutionary tradition.
